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This paper aims at contributing to the literature on the differences in the transmission processes
within Euroland. We start from the proposition that there are ‘deep’ differences in the nature of
social conflicts and in the way countries deal with these conflicts. We empirically test this effect
for the EU-growth and introduce several proxies for social conflicts and conflict management.
We then analyse (in addition to common growth variables) an EU wide shock and find that
differences in the social conflict and the conflict management institutions contribute to different
effects on economic growth. We conclude by presenting a model giving a theoretical foundation
of the empirical results.
We are grateful to Koen Vermeylen, especially for his advice on the theoretical part, and
acknowledge the financial support of the Flemish Science Foundation (FWO).1
1 1    I In nt tr ro od du uc ct ti io on n
One of the conditions for a smooth-functioning of the European Monetary Union is that
disturbances should not be asymmetric. A vast literature exists analysing to what extent
shocks in Euroland will become more or less asymmetric. A consensus on this issue has
as yet not emerged. Recently, economists have analysed whether and how the
transmission process of the same shocks (e.g. interest rates) differs among the member
states of EMU (see Dornbusch et al. (1998), Checcetti (1999) and Maclennan et al.
(1999)). The consensus here is that these asymmetries in the transmission processes are
significant today. They result from the fact that legal systems, cultures, and social and
political structures continue to differ among countries. This then leads to different
patterns of reactions to the same shocks in the labour markets, the financial markets, the
housing markets, etc. The question that remains open, is whether these ‘deep’ differences
will disappear so that one should expect convergence of these transmission processes in
the future.
This paper aims at contributing to the literature on the differences in the transmission
processes within Euroland. We will start from the proposition that there are ‘deep’
differences in the nature of social conflicts and in the way countries deal with these
conflicts. We will then analyse how these differences are responsible for different
patterns of transmission of the same shocks. More in particular we focus on how these
different transmission processes affect economic growth performances.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we survey the literature analysing how
social conflicts and the management of these conflicts affect economic growth. We will
use the insights of this literature in section 3 to analyse empirically how conflicts and
conflict resolution in the EU-countries differ and what the implications are for the
growth performances in the EU for the period 1961-95. In section 4, we present a
theoretical model that focuses on how differences in tax fraud and its punishment affect
growth potential when a shock occurs.2
2 2    C Co on nf fl li ic ct t   a an nd d   G Gr ro ow wt th h: :   a a   S Su ur rv ve ey y   o of f   t th he e   L Li it te er ra at tu ur re e
Recently the importance of conflicts and conflict management for the process of
economic growth has been recognised. An innovative study is Rodrik (1998). His basic
idea is that economic growth is not only determined by the variables of classical growth
models, but also by the process through which countries absorb external shocks that
affect income distribution. For example, when a negative terms of trade shock occurs,
this will affect the distribution of income of major groups in society. The conflict to
which this leads must be managed. The way this conflict management is organised has
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with f(.) a negative function.
Thus, the way an external shock affects economic growth depends on the balance
between social conflicts and the way they are resolved. For example, consider a country
with a lot of latent social conflicts (due to say large income inequalities). If the
institutions that manage these conflicts are weak, i. e. they are not capable of distributing
the income effects in a fair manner, the external shock will have a strong negative effect
on economic growth. In other countries with few social conflicts or with institutions
capable of managing these conflicts effectively, the same external shock will have fewer
negative consequences for economic growth. In our empirical implementation for the
EU-countries we will use Rodrik’s general framework giving practical content to social
conflict and conflict management in the EU-countries.
A number of recent papers have analysed the influence of corruption and bureaucratic
inefficiency on economic growth. Jones (1998) studies how corruption, tax rates and
bureaucratic inefficiency affect investment in infrastructure and thus economic growth.3
Tornell and Lane (1998) construct a growth model with two sectors, a high return
formal sector and a less efficient shadow sector. In their model, taxes are perceived in the
formal sector only and are exclusively used to pay transfers to powerful groups in the
shadow sector. Tornell and Lane find that if there is a positive productivity shock in the
formal sector, there will be less growth in the formal sector but more growth in the
shadow sector, under the condition that there are powerful pressure groups and no
institutional barriers to discretionary redistribution.
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) situate the problem of corruption in a principal agent
framework: a corrupt official has some effective property rights over the government
good he is allocating. Their paper focuses on the consequences of corruption for the
resource allocation. The central question is why bribery is much more costly than its
sister activity taxation. They argue that the imperative of secrecy makes bribes more
distortionary than taxes. Corruption reallocates resources most of the times in an
inefficient way.
Bertola (1993) presents a model focusing on the distinction between accumulated and
non-accumulated factors of production and points to the conflict of interest that exists
among individuals with differing sources of income. He uses an endogenous growth
model and introduces the fact that private production requires the provision of public
services. The higher is the factor-endowment share of the median voter above unity, the
lower is the rate of growth of the economy. Or, the more unequal is the distribution of
income and wealth the lower is the rate of growth.
The link between shocks, conflicts and growth has also been tested empirically. Easterly
et al. (1993) for example look for an explanation of low persistence of economic growth
rates. As the common explanatory variables for growth models are all more persistent
than the growth rates, they analyse the effect of shocks on long run growth. They define
three shock variables and find substantial explanatory power of these shock variables and
justify it by factor movements, i.e. the movement from negative shock sectors to positive4
shock sectors. Moreover, the shock variables influence growth also indirectly through
policy changes.
Alesina et al. (1992) investigate the relationship between political instability and per
capita GDP growth in a sample of 113 countries for the period 1950-82. They define
political instability as the propensity of a change in the executive, either by constitutional
or unconstitutional means. Their empirical results suggest that the degree of political
instability negatively affects per capita GDP growth.
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) focus on how an economy’s initial configuration of resources
shapes the political struggle for income and wealth distribution, and how that, in turn,
affects long-run growth. They use the median voter theorem, according to which the tax
rate selected by the government is the one preferred by the median voter. The more
equitable is the distribution in the economy, the better endowed is the median voter with
capital. They find out that the lower the equilibrium level of capital taxation, the higher is
the economy’s growth. Distributive struggles are more likely to take place when
resources are distributed unevenly. Their empirical finding is that the land GINI
coefficient has a statistically significant and negative effect on long term economic
growth.
3 3    T Th he e   E Em mp pi ir ri ic ca al l   M Mo od de el l
In this section we describe the model that we will use to analyse differences in social
conflicts and the institutions managing these conflicts in the EU. We will use the
framework as proposed by Rodrik (1998). In addition to the traditional explanatory
variables (e.g. initial income levels, saving, investment, population growth, investment in
education) that have been used extensively in economic growth econometric models (see
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)), we add indicators of social conflict and of the
management of social conflict. We specify our empirical growth model as follows:5
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GDPCGR is the GDP per capita growth, SHOCK is some exogenous shock, GINI and
ELF are indices for income disparity and ethno-linguistic fragmentation, respectively;
GOVC and PMC are the number of government and of prime minister changes during
the period.  These variables are used as proxies for social conflict. BUR is an index of
bureaucratic efficiency, GVTEXP is the government consumption expenditure in percent
of GDP, TAX are tax revenues in percent of GDP. We use the latter three variables as
indicators of the capacity of a country to manage social conflicts. CONFL stands for the
social conflict, MGTINST for the conflict management institutions.
The other explanatory variables are the traditional ones in the econometric studies of
economic growth, i.e. GDPCY1 which is GDP per capita in the initial year of the period,
SAV and GFCF are the rates of saving and investment (in percent of GDP), POPGR is
the growth of the population, EDUEXP is the expenditure on education, EUM a dummy
for the membership in the European community (union), and TRADE are imports plus
exports divided by the GDP.
The specification of equation (1) measures separately the effect of the shock, the social
conflict and the conflict management institutions on long term economic growth. As we
want to find out whether the effect of a shock on economic growth is amplified through
the conflict variables, we also run the regression with an interaction term of the shock
and the conflict variables. The estimated equation is:6
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where INTERACT is an interaction term consisting each time of the shock, multiplied














We will now first define the shock, then the underlying social conflict and the conflict
management institutions and finally the traditional growth variables. Summary statistics
and graphs for the shock and the conflict variables can be found in Appendix B.
3 3. .1 1    T Th he e   S Sh ho oc ck k
The shock we will consider in this study is a deterioration of the terms of trade. It is
defined in the following way:
( ) ( ) ￿
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where M, X and GDP are imports, exports and the GDP in current prices and USD
exchange rates, and ToT are the terms of trade. The subscript y indicates the year and p
the period of 10 years.
1
                                               
1 This definition deviates from the one of Rodrik who defines his shock in the following way:7
3 3. .2 2    T Th he e   S So oc ci ia al l   C Co on nf fl li ic ct t
Two indices reflecting the latent social conflict are introduced into the growth model.
The first one is the GINI index of income disparities. This index has been used in other
economic growth studies. For example, Alesina and Rodrik (1994), use the GINI index
for land distribution to find out the effect on long-run growth of political struggle for
income and wealth distribution. They conclude that higher inequality leads to lower long-
run growth.
The second index concerns the ethno-linguistic fragmentation within a country. It is
defined as the probability that two randomly selected persons from a given country will
not belong to the same ethno-linguistic group.
As we only have one data point per country for these two variables, they can only
explain the difference in growth rates between countries and not the changes over time.
Two indicators varying over time have therefore also been included, i.e. the number of
changes of the government (GOVC) and of the prime minister (PMC) respectively.
These variables are not only a sign of political instability, they can also be interpreted as
indicators of social unrest.


















The difference between the two definitions is that our variable only takes into account negative shocks,
whereas Rodrik calculates the standard deviation of the growth in the terms of trade without
differentiating between positive and negative shocks. We take the view that negative and positive shocks
do not have symmetric effects.8
3 3. .3 3    T Th he e   C Co on nf fl li ic ct t   M Ma an na ag ge em me en nt t
As a proxy for conflict management, we introduce the bureaucratic inefficiency index of
Mauro (1995)
2. This variable is the average of three indices: the inefficiency of the
judiciary system, red tape and corruption. The indicator lies between 0 (efficient
bureaucracy) to 10 (high inefficiency) and does not vary over time (as is the case with
the GINI and the index for ethno-linguistical fragmentation).
Although the consensus view is that this variable should have a negative effect on
economic growth (see e.g. Rodrik (1998)), because it leads to inefficient allocations of
resources, some authors have suggested that corruption (which is one component of the
bureaucracy index) might raise economic growth. The reason is that bribes can be seen
as the lubricant that increases the work effort of civil servants, thereby increasing the
efficiency of the bureaucracy
3.
We introduce the government expenditure and tax revenues as two other proxies for the
quality of conflict management
4; they also explain variation over time and are expressed
in percent of GDP.
3 3. .4 4    T Th he e   T Tr ra ad di it ti io on na al l   G Gr ro ow wt th h   V Va ar ri ia ab bl le es s
The theory of growth states that per capita growth should tend to converge because low-
income countries have a higher marginal productivity of capital than high-income
countries. This idea is based on the assumption of diminishing returns to capital.
                                               
2 Note that in Mauro the index is reversed and defined as an efficiency index.
3 Mauro (1995), p. 681
4 There is no granger causality between GDP per capita on the one hand, and government expenditure
(tax revenue) on the other.9
To find some evidence on this we introduced the GDP per capita in the first year of each
period (GDPY1) into our equation. Countries with a low initial GDP per capita should
thus have a higher growth rate; i.e. the variable should have a negative effect on growth.
The initial GDP per capita may also be interpreted as an indicator of imitation. As
imitation is cheaper than innovation, especially poorer countries choose this channel for
technological advances. This should lead to conditional convergence.
5
Graph 1 illustrates this relationship for the members of the EU. It represents the
logarithm of the GDP per capita of the initial year of each period of ten years (from
1961-70 to 1986-95) on the x-axis, and the GDP per capita growth rate on the y-axes.
The trend line is downwards sloping, i.e. the higher the initial level of GDP per capital,
the lower the growth rate.
G Gr ra ap ph h   1 1    G GD DP P   p pe er r   c ca ap pi it ta a   g gr ro ow wt th h   a an nd d   i in ni it ti ia al l   G GD DP P   p pe er r   c ca ap pi it ta a
These variables describing the steady state are, according to neo-classical growth
models, the population growth (or the growth of labour force), saving, capital, the
technological progress and the labour skill. We introduce the population growth, the
                                               














growth of the savings rate and the growth rate of gross fixed capital formation
6 divided
by GDP into our equation. The skill of the labour force is represented by the expenditure
on education. As we only have one observation of this variable per country, it only
explains growth differences between countries and not the change of growth over time.
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) introduced the years of schooling as variable for
education. In our example, expenditure on education is more adequate, as tertiary
schooling has less variation across EU countries than expenditure on education – unlike
in the regression of Barro and Sala-i-Martin who included a larger sample of more
heterogeneous countries.
We also add the openness of the countries into our equation. Levine and Renelt (1992)
argue that open economies better absorb foreign technology and suffer less from credit
constraints that limit investment. Therefore, we introduce trade (imports plus exports)
divided by the GDP as explanatory variable.
Finally, as not all of the countries participate in the European union since the beginning
of the period, we construct a dummy for EU membership. This dummy is equal to one in
the years were the country is member of the EU, and zero otherwise.
4 4    T Th he e   E Em mp pi ir ri ic ca al l   R Re es su ul lt ts s
Equation (1.) is estimated for the period 1961-95. Our observations are ten year
averages so that the first observation spans 1961-1970 and the last one 1986-1995.
Because of the overlapping sample, we use the Newey-West heteroscedasticity and
                                               
6 Barro (1994) argues that the empirical finding of a significant effect of investment on growth can also
be due to an inverse relationship, so that the instrument of lagged investment has to be introduced. As in
his sample, lagged investments do not have a significant effect on growth, he concludes that there is
inverse relationship. However, in our sample, lagged GFCF still has a significant effect on growth, so
that the significance is apparently not only due to inverse causality.11
autocorrelation consistent standard errors with a truncation lag of 9 years. Table 1
reports the regression results of equation (1.).
7
                                               
7 For those variables where we found evidence for granger causality, we ran the regression with their
lagged values as instruments. As we found approximately the same results, we do not produce the results
here.12
T Ta ab bl le e   1 1: :   R Re es su ul lt ts s   o of f   E Eq qu ua at ti io on n   ( (1 1. .) )
C 0,014 0,049 *** 0,049 *** 0,057 *** 0,026 * 0,016 0,036 ** 0,035 *** 0,026 ** 0,043 ** 0,038 *** 0,025 ** 0,041 **
SHOCK -0,225 -0,192 -0,429 ** -0,225 -0,220 * -0,425 ** -0,227 -0,252 ** -0,424 ** -0,240 -0,252 ** -0,436 **
GINI -3,E-4 -6,E-4 *** -3,E-4
ELF 1,E-4 ** 7,E-5 9,E-5 *
GOVC -6,E-4 -1,E-3 ** -2,E-3 ***
PMC 1,E-4 -1,E-3 ** -1,E-3 **
BUR -0,005 *** -0,005 *** -0,006 *** -0,006 ***
GVTEXP -0,001 *** -0,001 *** -0,001 *** -0,001 ***
TAX -0,001 *** -0,001 *** -0,001 *** -0,001 ***
GDPY1 -0,038 *** -0,049 *** -0,021 ** -0,025 *** -0,047 *** -0,011 -0,022 *** -0,046 *** -0,019 *** -0,022 ** -0,046 *** -0,018 *** -0,020 *
SAV -0,027 0,071 -0,009 -0,086 *** 0,072 * -0,004 -0,079 *** 0,076 * -0,021 -0,093 *** 0,088 ** 0,002 -0,074 ***
GFCF 0,132 *** 0,098 *** 0,071 ** 0,119 *** 0,127 *** 0,104 *** 0,137 *** 0,113 *** 0,116 *** 0,149 *** 0,095 *** 0,102 *** 0,139 ***
POPGR -0,541 *** -0,495 *** -0,471 *** -0,548 *** -0,527 *** -0,492 *** -0,556 *** -0,569 *** -0,618 *** -0,585 *** -0,559 *** -0,621 *** -0,587 ***
EDUEXP 0,460 *** 0,246 ** 0,636 *** 0,591 *** 0,330 *** 0,610 *** 0,633 *** 0,240 ** 0,606 *** 0,634 *** 0,214 * 0,660 *** 0,665 ***
EUM 0,006 ** 0,005 ** 0,009 *** 0,008 *** 0,004 ** 0,007 *** 0,007 *** 0,003 * 0,006 *** 0,006 *** 0,003 0,007 *** 0,006 ***
TRADE -0,009 * -0,018 *** 0,001 0,004 -0,020 *** 0,002 0,003 -0,017 *** 0,003 0,005 -0,018 *** 0,001 0,004
A-RSQ 0,60 0,69 0,66 0,59 0,70 0,64 0,49 0,68 0,73 0,56 0,68 0,73 0,54
* significant at 10%; 
**: significant at 5%; 
***: significant at 1%;
The adjusted R2 is lower in some regressions with conflict variables than in the regression without conflict variables, as there are missing values for the
conflict variables.13
The coefficient of the shock variable is negative, but not always significantly different from
zero at a confidence interval of 5%
8.
We can see that for the variables of the underlying social conflict, the evidence is mixed.
Except for ELF (ethno-linguistic fragmentation), the coefficients have the expected negative
sign, although not always significantly so.
The positive sign of the ethno-linguistic fragmentation variable (ELF) is intriguing. One way
to interpret this result is to consider that ethno-linguistic fragmentation has two effects. One
is to increase conflict in society (call it the Bosnia-effect). The other is to create a dynamics
for groups at the lower end of the social ladder to climb up by above average economic
achievements (call it the American melting-pot effect). Our results suggest that the second
effect has dominated the first one in the EU
9
For the proxies of conflict management institutions, the results are always negative and
significant even at 1%. Thus, the inability to manage conflicts (as measured by size and
inefficiency of public administrations) tends to reduce economic growth.
The other more traditional explanatory variables (initial GDP per capita, investment,
population growth
10, expenditure on education and the EU dummy) generally have the
expected effects. The exceptions are the savings rate and the trade variable, which have
insignificant effects most of the time and do not always have the expected sign.
                                               
8 Remember that this variable catches up only the effect of negative shocks and is always positive, so that the
coefficient is negative.
9 For a recent fascinating economic history book stressing the positive effects of ethnic and national
fragmentation on economic growth see Landes, David (1998), The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why
Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor, W. W. Norton & Company
10 Note that the coefficient of population growth is negative. This negative sign is due to the fact that the
dependent variable is per capita growth. The fact that the estimated coefficient of population growth in our
regression is smaller than one suggests that population growth has a positive effect on economic growth.14
Table 2 reports shows the regression results of the equation with an interaction term for the
shock and the conflict variables in order to find out whether our conflict variables amplify
external shocks (equation 2.)
T Ta ab bl le e   2 2: :   R Re es su ul lt ts s   o of f   E Eq qu ua at ti io on n   2 2. .
SGB SGG SGT SEB SEG SET SGCB SGCG SGCT SPMB SPMG SPMT
C 0,022 ** 0,010 0,012 0,014 -3E-4 0,006 0,009 0,001 0,005 0,004 -0,002 0,003
INTERACT -1,E-2 *** -3,E-4 *** -2,E-4 4,E-4 9,E-5 1,E-4 -0,088 *** -0,003 *** -0,003 *** -0,051 *** -0,002 *** -0,002 *
GDPY1 -0,045 *** -0,037 *** -0,034 *** -0,039 *** -0,031 *** -0,031 *** -0,040 *** -0,036 *** -0,035 *** -0,040 *** -0,036 *** -0,033 ***
SAV 0,028 -0,028 -0,029 -0,028 -0,009 -0,014 0,006 -0,043 ** -0,043 * 0,039 -0,017 -0,021
GFCF 0,118 *** 0,128 *** 0,129 *** 0,135 *** 0,134 *** 0,133 *** 0,155 *** 0,172 *** 0,162 *** 0,140 *** 0,157 *** 0,151 ***
POPGR -0,383 *** -0,371 *** -0,538 *** -0,546 *** -0,439 *** -0,588 *** -0,449 *** -0,471 *** -0,503 *** -0,432 *** -0,492 *** -0,528 ***
EDUEXP 0,403 *** 0,539 *** 0,442 *** 0,468 *** 0,521 *** 0,407 *** 0,400 *** 0,565 *** 0,482 *** 0,487 *** 0,584 *** 0,467 ***
EUM 0,005 *** 0,008 *** 0,006 ** 0,006 ** 0,006 ** 0,005 ** 0,004 *** 0,008 *** 0,006 *** 0,005 *** 0,008 *** 0,006 **
TRADE -0,011 ** -0,005 -0,004 -0,009 * -0,011 * -0,007 -0,007 * -0,006 -0,004 -0,012 *** -0,007 -0,005
A-RSQ 0,70 0,47 0,49 0,60 0,43 0,49 0,71 0,63 0,45 0,68 0,62 0,43
* significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***: significant at 1%
The interaction term is significant and negative in almost all regressions except those, which
contain ELF and the regression with SGT as interaction term. This seems logical, as the
coefficient for ELF was positive in the previous regression, so that the whole terms becomes
insignificant now. As in the regression with the separate term, the interaction term SGT is
not significant.
The results for the other variables are broadly the same as for equation (1.).
5 5    T Th he e   G Gr ro ow wt th h   E Ef ff fe ec ct t   o of f   a an n   E EU U- -w wi id de e   S Sh ho oc ck k
The aim of this section is to analyse in how far a symmetric shock is transmitted differently
because of differences in social institutions. The way we proceed is as follows. We impose
the same terms of trade shock on all countries, which we take to be the average size of the
shock during the sample period. The growth loss due to a deviation of the conflict variables
from the EU minimum, given an EU-wide shock, can be written as:15
( ) t t EUt it it EUt it MGTINST CONFL SHOCK MGTINST CONFL SHOCK GDPCGR min min 1 ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ = D b
with b1  the coefficient of the interaction term in equation (2.).
The outcome,  it GDPCGR D , indicates how much less growth would have taken place in this
country when an EU-wide shock would have occurred, because the conflict variables were
different from that of the country with the best performance within the EU. The results can
be found in table 3.
T Ta ab bl le e   3 3: :   G Gr ro ow wt th h   L Lo os ss s   t th hr ro ou ug gh h   E EU U- -w wi id de e   S Sh ho oc ck k   ( (i in n   % %) )
A BL DK FIN FR GE GR IR IT NL PO SP SW UK EU
SGB -0,409 -0,252 -0,105 -0,184 -0,629 -0,342 -1,647 -0,478 -1,169 0,000 -1,455 -0,936 -0,201 -0,342 -0,582
SGG -0,104 -0,204 -0,153 -0,137 -0,260 -0,133 -0,204 -0,245 -0,178 -0,264 -0,084 -0,050 -0,243 -0,179 -0,174
SGCB -0,062 -0,044 -0,089 -0,250 -0,204 -0,095 -0,810 -0,299 -0,696 0,000 -1,223 -0,508 -0,159 -0,137 -0,327
SGCG -0,052 -0,079 -0,349 -0,556 -0,206 -0,115 -0,283 -0,362 -0,315 -0,294 -0,303 -0,157 -0,559 -0,188 -0,273
SGCT -0,041 -0,070 -0,332 -0,511 -0,192 -0,096 -0,199 -0,292 -0,247 -0,250 -0,268 -0,118 -0,394 -0,173 -0,227
SPMB -0,116 -0,167 -0,064 -0,178 -0,406 -0,108 -0,718 -0,246 -1,328 0,000 -1,252 -0,424 -0,129 -0,125 -0,376
SPMG -0,085 -0,335 -0,245 -0,421 -0,397 -0,099 -0,199 -0,310 -0,596 -0,215 -0,317 -0,121 -0,413 -0,157 -0,279
It is obvious that the effect of the interaction term is much lower than the effect of the
conflict variables of the separate regression taken together. This is because the interaction
term only catches up the growth effect of these three variables that are linked with each
other.
The combination of GINI with BUR has the highest effect on growth (0,58% for the EU
average). All interaction terms with the bureaucratic inefficiency index have a comparatively
high impact on growth. Remember however that this indicator does not vary over time so
that it explains only differences between countries. The figures in graph 2 represent the
growth effect of the interaction term.16
G Gr ra ap ph h   2 2    G Gr ro ow wt th h    L Lo os ss s    t th hr ro ou ug gh h    I IN NT TE ER RA AC CT T    w wi it th h    a an n    E EU U- -w wi id de e    S Sh ho oc ck k    ( (i in n    % %) )    - -    B BU UR R    a as s
C Co on nf fl li ic ct t   V Va ar ri ia ab bl le e
G Gr ra ap ph h   3 3    G Gr ro ow wt th h   L Lo os ss s   t th hr ro ou ug gh h   I IN NT TE ER RA AC CT T   w wi it th h   a an n   E EU U- -w wi id de e   S Sh ho oc ck k   ( (i in n   % %) )   - -    G GV VT TE EX XP P

















































A BL DK FIN FR GE GR IR IT NL PO SP SW UK17
When we use the bureaucratic inefficiency index we find that Southern countries (Spain,
Italy, Portugal and Greece) are most effected. Thus, some negative terms of trade shock
reduces economic growth by 1% to 1,5% in these countries as compared to less than 0,5%
in Northern countries. One can conclude that the existing difference in bureaucratic
efficiencies can lead to relatively large differences in the transmission of the same terms of
trade shocks in the EU.
We find much less differences in the transmission of terms of trade shocks when we use
either government spending or taxes as measures of conflict management. The transmission
effect on growth remains within a narrow band of approximately 0,1% to 0,6%.
6 6    T Th he eo or re et ti ic ca al l   F Fo ou un nd da at ti io on n   o of f   t th he e   M Mo od de el l
In this section we present a theoretical model that aims at giving a theoretical foundation to
some of the empirical effects we have found in the previous section. We will focus on one
phenomenon, i.e. the effect of bureaucratic inefficiency in the collection of taxes. In order to
do so we set up a model consisting of a formal and a shadow section; Producers have the
choice to produce in the formal and the shadow sector. Their decision depends on the
efficiency of the bureaucracy to detect and to tax revenue in the shadow sector.
We first derive the results for the producer side, and then for households. Combining both
we obtain the equilibrium values for production and analyse the effect of a terms of trade
shock on this equilibrium value.
6 6. .1 1    T Th he e   P Pr ro od du uc ce er r
We consider an economy with two representative firms, one producing in the formal sector
(F) and the other in the shadow sector (S). The production functions of both firms are
identical. The difference lies in the payment of turnover taxes (tt) which are only paid by the
firm in the formal sector. The other firm faces a risk of being detected, Prt(d). In this case, it
has to pay a punishment equal to pt times the non-paid taxes. In an infinite horizon model,18
and using a Cobb-Douglas production function, we can write the value of the firm in the
formal sector for period t as:
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t L E K Y (4.)
The value of the firm in the shadow sector is correspondingly:
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t L E K Y (6.)
with Vt
i(Kt
i) the value of the firm at time t, Yt
i the production function, Pt the price (equal in
both sectors and exogenous), It
i investment, Kt
i and Lt
i the amount of capital and labour, Et
i
is the technological progress, wt
i the wages, tt are turnover taxes, r the interest rate and d
the depreciation rate of capital, the subscript t designing the period and the superscript i the
sector, i = F,S (F for formal sector, S for shadow sector). We assume that the interest rate
and the depreciation rate are the same in both sectors, and the depreciation rate is moreover
constant over time.
We assume that Pr(d)tt > 1, i.e. the tax contribution (either through turnover taxes, or
through the punishment when being detected) is higher in the formal than in the shadow19
sector. As the shadow sector is submitted to less competition than the formal sector, the




























i.e. the marginal product of capital equals the interests.































into (7.) we obtain:













Equation (8.) states that the interest rate plus the depreciation rate of capital is equal to the
production divided by capital and multiplied with the share of capital in the production.
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Finally, production has to be equal to the sum of consumption, investment and taxes:20








t t - + - + = (11.)
We will assume that government spending (G) is equal to tax revenues (T), and that
government spending is fixed over time, so that we have:
t
S
t t t t
F
t t P Y d P Y G p t t ) Pr( + = (12.)
The implication of this assumption is that if total production diminishes, the government
must either rise taxes on turnover, or increase the probability of being detected when
producing in the shadow sector, or increase the punishment rate when being detected.
6 6. .2 2    T Th he e   H Ho ou us se eh ho ol ld d
As the firms need workers in the formal as well as in the shadow sectors, households also
have to be split into two groups, working each in one sector. Households will maximise the
following utility function subject to the flow budget constraint:
( ) ( ) [ ]
( )( )
condition lity  transversa       A
r
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i is the consumption of sector i at time t, b the preference for leisure, and At
i the
assets of households working in sector i at time t (i = F,S).































































i.e. consumption in period t+1 is equal to consumption in period t multiplied by the interest
divided by the time preference.
6 6. .3 3    T Th he e   E Eq qu ui il li ib br ri iu um m
We want to find out the effect of a productivity shock in the formal sector on capital
(production) in the formal sector relative to the shadow sector. For this purpose, we first
need to assume that the economy is in a steady state. In order to find the steady state, we
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We also assume that the technological progress grows at a rate g:




t + = + 1 1
This rate is assumed to be the same in both sectors in the steady state.












































t t F (18.)











































t t t S (20.)
in the shadow sector.
Social conflict and conflict-management institutions affect our model in the following way.
Consider an economy where the firm producing in the shadow sector has the power to
influence the government decision on the probability of being detected when working in the
shadow sector, and/or the punishment rate. By influencing these variables, the firm can
extract money from the firm producing in the formal sector. We know from equation (12.)
that the government budget has to be balanced. Assuming that government spending is
distributed evenly for the two sectors, the way to extract wealth from the formal sector is to
put some pressure on politicians to reduce the probability to be detected when producing in
the shadow sector, or to reduce the punishment rate. As the government budget has to be
balanced, this entails an increase in the tax rate, so that firms in the formal sector pay most
part of the decrease in the contribution of powerful groups in the shadow sector. However,
if good conflict management institutions are put into place, there are fewer possibilities for
the firm in the shadow sector to reduce the probability of being detected or the
corresponding punishment rate. In terms of Rodrik (1998), the existence of a powerful firm
in the shadow sector can be interpreted as an underlying social conflict. As we maximised
the value of the two representative firms in the formal and the shadow sector independently,23
the existence of a powerful firm (without adequate conflict management institutions) leads
to a relatively big shadow sector (compare equations (18.) and (20.)). As the productivity in
the formal sector is higher than in the shadow sector, this will result in less economic
growth.
6 6. .4 4    T Th he e   E Ef ff fe ec ct t   o of f   T Te er rm ms s   o of f   T Tr ra ad de e   S Sh ho oc ck ks s
We now analyse the effect of a terms of trade shock in both sectors (DPt). We focus on how
this effect is amplified through our conflict variables (ttPrt(d)pt). For this purpose we derive
Yt
F and Yt
S with respect to Pt:
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1
The ratio of the effect of the shock on the production in the formal sector and the effect on












































The question is whether the nominator or the denominator is bigger, i.e. whether the effect































If so, the effect of a terms of trade shock will be stronger in the formal sector.
We can see from this term that the higher Prt(d)pt (the better the conflict management
institutions), the smaller the denominator is relative to the nominator, and thus the smaller
the effect of a terms of trade shock on the shadow sector relative to the formal sector. The
existence of a powerful firm in the shadow sector without adequate conflict management
institutions will lead to a relatively higher effect of the terms of trade shock in the formal
than in the shadow sector.
We know from equation (12.) that the government budget has to be balanced. If Yt
F and Yt
S
decrease due to a negative shock, the government thus has to raise its revenues either
through an increase in taxes (tt), or through an increase in Prt(d)pt. In the first case, the
effect in the shadow sector is amplified relative to the formal sector as Prt(d)pt > 1.
7 7    C Co on nc cl lu us si io on n
In this paper we combined two strands of the economic literature. One is the literature on
economic growth, the other is the literature on the different transmission processes of the
same shock in Euroland. The economic growth literature tells us that the existence of social
conflicts and the ability to master these conflicts affect economic growth prospects of
nations. In particular, these social variables affect how a given terms of trade shock
influences economic growth. Countries experiencing a lot of social (distributive) conflicts
and weak institutions to master these conflicts will tend to be more affected by the same
terms of trade disturbances than other countries. We applied this idea to Euroland. We first
developed an econometric model explaining economic growth in the EU. We found that
indeed differences in social conflict variables and differences in bureaucratic efficiency have
significant effects on economic growth.25
We then used these results to simulate how the same terms of trade shock affects economic
growth in the EU. Our main conclusion is that differences in social conflicts and bureaucratic
efficiency lead to different effects on economic growth after the same terms of trade shock.
More specifically we found that Southern EU countries suffer more from a negative terms of
trade shock, mainly because of weak bureaucracies.
Finally we presented a theoretical model that gives some foundation to the empirical
phenomenon detected in this study. The model consists of a formal and a shadow sector. We
find that the inefficiency in the detection of fraud and the imposition of penalties tends to
amplify the effect of a terms of trade shock on output.26
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A Ap pp pe en nd di ix x   A A: :   D De ef fi in ni it ti io on n   o of f   t th he e   V Va ar ri ia ab bl le es s
GDPCGR: GDP per capita growth, GDP (national currencies, current prices) and
population from OECD, converted into GDP in US dollar (1990 prices and
exchange rates) with deflator and US dollar exchange rates from OECD;
GINI: GINI index for income disparity, from Deininger and Squire (1996)
ELF: Index for ethno-linguistic fragmentation, from Mauro (1995)
GOVC: Number of government changes, from http://web.jet.es/ziaorarr/00index.htm,
'Political Leaders 1945-99'
PMC: Number of prime minister changes from
http://web.jet.es/ziaorarr/00index.htm, 'Political Leaders 1945-99'
BUR: Index for bureaucracy efficiency, from Mauro (1995)
GVTEXP: Total Expenditure: General Government (Percentage of GDP in Market
Prices), European Economy, No 60, 1995
TAX: Total tax revenue as percentage of GDP / Tax revenues, OECD Revenue
Statistics
GDPY1: GDP of the first year of the period of ten years (in log); source see GDPCGR
SAV : Gross savings rate, European Economy, no 60, 1995; p; 192-93, table 50
GFCF : Gross fixed capital formation by GDP, OECD National Accounts I
POPGR: Growth rate of total population, calculated from total population, OECD
Labour Force Statistics
EDUEXP: Education expenditure by GDP in 1985, from World Bank, World Tables.
EUM: dummy for EU membership, see Gravity
TRADE: imports plus exports in current home currency, divided by GDP in current
home currency; imports and exports from IFS, GDP from OECD (see above)
(also for the definition of SHOCK)
TOT: Terms of trade (for the definition of SHOCK) European Economy, No 6028
A Ap pp pe en nd di ix x   B B: :   S St ta at ti is st ti ic ca al l   S Su um mm ma ar ry y   f fo or r   t th he e   S Sh ho oc ck k, ,   S So oc ci ia al l   C Co on nf fl li ic ct t   a an nd d   C Co on nf fl li ic ct t
M Ma an na ag ge em me en nt t
G Gr ra ap ph h   B B. .1 1    G GD DP P   p pe er r   c ca ap pi it ta a   ( (g gr ro ow wt th h) )   ( (a av ve er ra ag ge e   1 19 96 61 1- -9 95 5) )   f fo or r   E EU U1 14 4








































A BL DK FIN FR GE GR IRL IT NL PO SP SW UK
GOVC PMC29
G Gr ra ap ph h   B B. .3 3    C Co on nf fl li ic ct t   M Ma an na ag ge em me en nt t   - -   a av ve er ra ag ge e   1 19 96 61 1- -9 95 5




















































































































A BL DK FIN FR GE GR IRL IT NL PO SP SW UK
GVTEXP TAX30
T Ta ab bl le e   B B. .1 1    C Co or rr re el la at ti io on n   B Be et tw we ee en n   t th he e   T Tr ra ad di it ti io on na al l   G Gr ro ow wt th h   V Va ar ri ia ab bl le es s
GDPCGR GDPY1 SAV GFCF POPGR EDUEXP EUM TRADE
GDPCGR 1,00 -0,51 0,32 0,46 -0,10 -0,04 -0,10 -0,02
GDPY1 -0,51 1,00 -0,52 -0,59 -0,17 0,55 0,17 0,09
SAV 0,32 -0,52 1,00 0,39 0,13 -0,33 0,23 0,09
GFCF 0,46 -0,59 0,39 1,00 0,27 -0,31 -0,48 -0,31
POPGR -0,10 -0,17 0,13 0,27 1,00 -0,07 0,00 0,01
EDUEXP -0,04 0,55 -0,33 -0,31 -0,07 1,00 -0,01 0,47
EUM -0,10 0,17 0,23 -0,48 0,00 -0,01 1,00 0,29
TRADE -0,02 0,09 0,09 -0,31 0,01 0,47 0,29 1,00
Bold italic: correlation superior to 0,5
T Ta ab bl le e   B B. .2 2    C Co or rr re el la at ti io on n   w wi it th h   t th he e   S Sh ho oc ck k, ,   S So oc ci ia al l   C Co on nf fl li ic ct t   a an nd d   C Co on nf fl li ic ct t   M Ma an na ag ge em me en nt t
SHOCK GINIGWB ELF GOVC PMC BUR GVTEXP TAX
GDPCGR 0,19 0,09 -0,10 0,01 0,20 0,20 -0,52 -0,48
GDPY1 -0,32 -0,43 0,14 -0,15 -0,23 -0,67 0,73 0,79
SAV 0,02 0,29 -0,10 -0,06 0,30 0,65 -0,33 -0,54
GFCF 0,14 0,05 -0,37 0,40 0,44 0,47 -0,64 -0,60
POPGR 0,32 0,17 -0,16 0,08 0,08 0,04 -0,20 -0,24
EDUEXP 0,11 -0,16 -0,15 0,03 0,03 -0,74 0,65 0,70
EUM 0,06 0,40 0,10 -0,28 -0,11 -0,11 0,26 0,14
TRADE 0,27 0,02 0,19 -0,14 -0,19 -0,50 0,50 0,40
SHOCK 1,00 0,33 -0,11 0,17 0,17 -0,05 -0,18 -0,27
GINIGWB 0,33 1,00 -0,08 0,20 0,31 0,27 -0,24 -0,30
ELF -0,11 -0,08 1,00 -0,31 -0,15 -0,11 0,04 0,06
GOVC 0,17 0,20 -0,31 1,00 0,68 0,11 -0,16 -0,14
PMC 0,17 0,31 -0,15 0,68 1,00 0,32 -0,28 -0,32
BUR -0,05 0,27 -0,11 0,11 0,32 1,00 -0,60 -0,74
GVTEXP -0,18 -0,24 0,04 -0,16 -0,28 -0,60 1,00 0,93
TAX -0,27 -0,30 0,06 -0,14 -0,32 -0,74 0,93 1,0031
T Ta ab bl le e   B B. .3 3    C Co or rr re el la at ti io on n   W Wi it th h   t th he e   I In nt te er ra ac ct ti io on n   T Te er rm m
SGB SGG SGT SEB SEG SET SGCB SGCG SGCT SPMB SPMG SPMT
GDPCGR 0,28 0,08 0,08 -0,13 -0,13 -0,12 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,20 0,14 0,15
GDPY1 -0,77 -0,18 -0,15 -0,10 0,12 0,13 -0,60 -0,16 -0,13 -0,59 -0,19 -0,17
SAV 0,57 0,00 -0,07 0,03 -0,05 -0,08 0,41 -0,12 -0,17 0,59 0,14 0,07
GFCF 0,50 -0,02 -0,03 -0,08 -0,36 -0,36 0,51 0,27 0,28 0,53 0,27 0,29
POPGR 0,26 0,29 0,27 0,06 -0,14 -0,15 0,22 0,25 0,23 0,23 0,24 0,23
EDUEXP -0,51 0,26 0,29 -0,44 -0,01 0,00 -0,38 0,21 0,23 -0,33 0,23 0,25
EUM -0,07 0,22 0,20 -0,10 0,15 0,15 -0,19 -0,10 -0,13 -0,09 0,06 0,03
TRADE -0,24 0,42 0,40 -0,19 0,38 0,36 -0,14 0,15 0,13 -0,24 0,18 0,16 
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